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Random Drug-Testing of Public School Student
Athletes: A Permissible Search under the Fourth
Amendment
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States is in an illicit drug use crisis. The social
and economic costs of illicit drugs have forced America to declare "war on drugs." In strictly business terms, the sale and
consumption of illicit drugs comprises the fastest growing "industry" in the United States collecting huge profits from $110
billion in annual sales. 1 More than ten million Americans
abuse prescription drugs, about thirteen million are alcoholics,
another twenty-two million have consumed cocaine, and at
least twenty-three million smoke marijuana on a regular basis. 2 The harms and costs of illicit drug use touch every sector
of American society. The most visible social and economic costs
of illicit drug use are those associated with drug-related crime
and crime prevention efforts.
The workplace is another area which suffers significant
social and economic costs. A recent survey of industrial relations executives indicates substance abuse is the top workplace
concern. 3 This response was motivated because substance
abuse costs employers $100 billion annually in lost productivity, increased absenteeism, and drug related injuries. 4 The
American Management Association and Arizona State University recently conducted a survey that reveals one out of every
ten workers in the United States uses illicit drugs at work. 5
Illicit drug use is particularly pervasive in school-aged children. Recent studies demonstrate that 58% of high school se-

1.
Ted W. Hunter, Understanding and Managing the Drug Abuse Revolution,
41ST NATIONAL CONFERENCE PRocEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR PERSON·
NEL ADMINISTRATION 265 (1989).
2.

Id.

3.
Albert R. Karr, Labor Letter, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 1989, at 1 (survey of
257 industrial labor executives conducted by the firm of Jackson, Lewis, Schnitzler
& Krupman).
4.
BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, ALcOHOL & DRUGS IN THE WORKPLACE: COSTS,
CONTROLS, AND CONTROVERSIES, 7-8 (1986).
J. MICHAEL WALSH & STEPHEN C. YOHAY, DRUG AND ALcOHOL ABUSE IN
5.
THE WORKPLACE: A GUIDE TO THE ISSUES 3-4 (1987).
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niors had used drugs and 13% of high school seniors had used
cocaine in the past year, more than double the figures in
1975.6 One-half of all young people entering the work force for
the fl.l"st time had used an illicit drug at least once within the
previous year. 7 Almost one-fourth, or approximately five million, among those aged twelve to seventeen, had used drugs
one or more times in their lives and almost one in ten, or 1.9
million had used a drug illicitly in the past month. 8 Among
eighteen to twenty-five year-olds, 17.5 million, constituting
59%, had used drugs illicitly one or more times in their lives.
Approximately 18%, or 5.3 million, had used drugs illicitly in
the month before the survey.9
Despite size, geographic location and socio-economic variables, survey data reveal that no high schools are drug-free.
One-hundred percent of the seniors surveyed attended high
schools where illicit drug use was reported, and 75% attended
schools where more than half of their classmates had tried an
illegal or controlled substance within the previous month. 10
These statistics significantly understate the true picture of
drug use in school-aged children. A large number of young drug
users either drop out or are pushed out of school during their
high school years. Simply stated, school-age children who are
most heavily involved in drugs are not in school and are not
counted in "student" drug use surveys. 11
Recreational drug use is not the only problem facing public
schools. Student athletes in public schools, like all professional
and amateur athletes, are motivated and encouraged to be the
strongest and fastest competitors. Unfortunately, many student
athletes resort to "doping"-the use of illicit performance-enhancing drugs. 12 Statistics are not available to demonstrate
6.
LAURO F. CAVAZOS, U.S. DEF'T OF EDUC., WHAT WORKS: SCHOOLS WITHOUT
DRUGS 5 (1989).
7.
Hunter, supra note 1 at 266.
8.
NATIONAL INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, U.S. DEF'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE: HIGHLIGHTS 1988 9 (1990)
[hereinafter DRUG ABUSE STATISTICS]. See also NATIONAL INST. ON DRUG ABUSE,
U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON
DRUG ABUSE: MAIN FINDINGS 1988 (1990); NATIONAL INST. OF DRUG ABUSE, U.S.
DEPT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., USE OF LICIT AND ILLICIT DRUGS BY
AMERICA'S HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS 1975-1984 (1985).
9.
DRUG ABUSE STATISTICS, supra note 8, at 9.
10.
NATIONAL COMM'N ON DRUG-FREE SCHS., U.S. DEPT OF EDUC., TOWARD A
DRUG-FREE GENERATION: A NATION'S RESPONSIBILITY 1 (1990).
11.
Id. at 10-11.
12.
Allison Rose, Mandatory Drug Testing of College Athletes: Are Athletes Being
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the use of many types of illicit performance-enhancing drugs.
However, some studies demonstrate that the use of anabolic
steroids is prevalent. A high school paper in Florida reported
that 18% of the male students attending school used steroids 13
and a nation-wide study estimates that nearly 7%, or as many
as 500,000, male high school seniors have used anabolic steroids.14 In response to both recreational and performance enhancing illicit drug use, many professional and amateur athletic associations and federations have adopted drug testing as
a method of protecting the health and safety of individual participants and a means of preserving the integrity of competition
and promoting societal "drug-free" interests.
A detailed examination of the harms related to illicit drug
use in public schools is beyond the scope of this article. However, the U.S. Supreme Court defined illicit drug use in public
schools as a major social problem and has taken judicial notice
that use of illicit drugs is detrimental to the effectiveness and
safety of public schools. 15 The Court also stated that public
schools may conduct reasonable searches in attempts to control
and eliminate substance abuse. 16 However, the Court has not
directly examined the issue of drug testing in public schools.
The lack of direction from the Court may be why few public
schools have initiated any type of drug-testing program despite
the fact that most public schools have written substance abuse
policies and some type of substance abuse education. 17
In Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp. (Schaill 1) 18
Denied Their Constitutional Rights?, 16 PEPP. L. REV. 45, 46 (1988) ("Doping is the
administering or use of substances in any form alien to the body or of physiological substances in abnormal amounts and with abnormal methods by healthy
persons with the exclusive aim of attaining artificial and unfair increase of performance in competition."); See Alvin P. Sanoff, Drug Problem in Athletics: It's Not
Only the Pros, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 17, 1983, at 64.
13.
Rick Telander, A Peril for Athletes, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 24, 1988, at
144.
14.
William E. Buckley et al., Estimated Prevalence of Anabolic Steroid Use
Among Male High School Seniors, 260 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 3441, 3445 (1988).
15.
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985).
16.
Id. at 340.
17.
U.S. DEF'T OF EDUC. & U.S. DEF'T OF HEATH AND HUMAN SERVS., REPORT
TO CONGRESS AND THE WHITE HOUSE ON THE NATURE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF FED·
ERAL, STATE, AND LocAL DRUG PREVENTIO!'VEDUCATION PRoGRAMS 19-20 (1987)
("Based on a random, stratified sample of 700 school districts, respondents indicate
that nearly three-fourths of the districts have a written policy on substance abuse
and three-fifths require substance abuse education for at least some grade
levels . . . . Only 4% of school districts report having drug-testing programs.")
(footnote omitted).
679 F. Supp. 833 (N.D. Ind.), atfd, (Schaill II), 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir.
18.
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an Indiana district court denied the declaratory and injunctive
relief sought by two student athletes alleging that the implementation of Tippecanoe County School Corporation's (TSC's)
random drug testing program: (1) violated their Fourth Amendment rights by subjecting them to unreasonable searches and
seizures; (2) interfered with their legitimate expectation of
privacy; (3) violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and (4) violated their constitutional rights
by predicating participation in interscholastic athletics upon
the waiver of these rights. 19 In Schaill II, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court decision concluding
that individualized suspicion is not required for searches of student athletes in public schools. 20 This article focuses on random urinalysis testing of public school athletes and examines
the Fourth Amendment issues involved.
II. TSC'S STUDENT ATHLETE DRUG EDUCATION AND TESTING
PROGRAM

TSC's Drug Education and Testing Program begins with a
review of the seriousness of illicit drug and alcohol abuse in
public schools and reference to information indicating significant illicit drug use among TSC interscholastic athletes. The
TSC program requires each student athlete to submit a consent
form signed and dated by the student and his custodial parent
or guardian prior to participating in any interscholastic
sport. 21 The program "involve[s] all participants in interscho1988).
19.
Schaill I, 679 F. Supp. at 848.
Schaill II, 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988).
20.
21.
Schaill I, 679 F. Supp at 836. The consent form reads as follows:
I have received and have read and understand a copy of the "TSC
DRUG EDUCATION AND TESTING PROGRAM." I desire that ~.,..,....,-...,..,....
---""7"" participate in this program and in the interscholastic athletic
program of
School and hereby voluntarily agree to be
subject to its terms. I ~ccept the method of obtaining urine samples, testing and analyses of such specimens, and all other aspects of the program.
I agree to cooperate in furnishing urine specimens that may be required
from time to time.
I further agree and consent to the disclosure of the sampling, testing
and results as provided for in this program. This consent is given pursu·
ant to all State and Federal Privacy Statutes and is a waiver of rights to
non-disclosure of such test records and results only to the extent of the
disclosures authorized in the program.

Id.
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lastic sports teams, both male and female, as well as members
of cheerleading teams, all of whom are collectively denominated
student athletes."22 The purposes of the TSC's program are:
to prevent drug and alcohol usage, to educate student
athletes as to the serious physical, mental and emotional
harm caused by drug and alcohol abuse, to alert student
athletes with possible drug problems to the potential
harms, to prevent injury, illness and harm as a result of

drug and alcohol abuse, and to maintain at TSC high
schools an athletic environment free of alcohol and drug
abuse. 23

TSC's program also states that student athletes hold positions of respect with the general student body and are therefore
expected to be "good examples of conduct, sportsmanship and
training, which includes avoiding drug and alcohol use. "24
The athletic director and the head coach of each team are
authorized to initiate and select an unlimited number of student athletes to test. Students are assigned selection numbers
which were drawn randomly from a box. 26 Each athlete selected is required to "provide a sample of urine in a verifiable manner, but the collection of the sample is not physically observed."26 A bottle containing the student's urine sample is
labeled with his assigned number, not his name. His assigned
number is indexed to his name on a master list. The student
athlete and the athletic director consult the master list to protect against errors in the assignment of numbers. They initial
the master list to evidence that the procedure is followed. 27
Toxicologists at a "competent laboratory" use a variety of
testing techniques to find "alcohol, street drugs ... and performance-enhancing drugs (such as steroids)" in the urine sample.28 Once a sample tests positive, it is retested to confirm
the results. 29 A sample tests positive if, after using at least
two type of analyses, drug-residue substances are present in
the system. The student athletes and their parents or guard-

22.
23.
24.

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 836-37.
Id. at 837.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 838-39.
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ians are given a chance for additional testing or other means of
explaining the positive test result. 30 Any student athlete testing positive without proper explanation would thereafter be
subject to testing any time they choose to participate in interscholastic athletic activity. In addition to random testing, TSC
retained the right to test any student at any time that reasonable suspicion of illicit drug or alcohol use exists. 81
Student athletes who test positive are not academically
disciplined, suspended or expelled. Rather, they incrementally
lose the privilege to participate in interscholastic athletic activities. 82 The first time a student athlete tests positive for alcohol, he or she cannot participate in one out of five athletic contests (200/o suspension). The first time he or she tests positive
for drugs, he or she cannot participate in approximately one
out of three athletic events (300/o suspension). The second, third
and fourth occurrences of either alcohol or drug result in a 500/o
suspension, a full calendar-year suspension, and an interscholastic career suspension, respectively. The fll'st and second suspensions can be reduced by participation in approved counseling.88

Ill.

FOURTH AMENDMENT

The principles of the Fourth Amendment are paramount in
determining the legality of any drug testing program in public
schools. The Fourth Amendment provides in relevant part:
[the] right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmations, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized. 84

To successfully challenge a drug and alcohol testing program
under the Fourth Amendment, litigants must establish fll'st,
that the testing constitutes a search under the Amendment, 85

30.
31.

32.
33.

34.
35.

!d. at 837.
!d.
Id.
I d. at 837-38.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333 (1985).
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and second, that the search is unreasonable. 36

A. Urinalysis Testing of Student Athletes by TSC Constitutes a
Search Under the Fourth Amendment
Relying on Supreme Court precedent, the district and appellate court in Schaill I and Schaill II found that activities of
public school officials have long been considered state actions
subject to the Fourth Amendment through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 37
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States,
protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its
creatures-Boards of Education not excepted. These have, of
course, important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions, but none that they may not perform within the limits of
the Bill of Rights. That they are educating the young for
citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the
free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important
principles of our government as mere platitudes. 38

In New Jersey v. T.L.0., 39 the Court rejected notions that
school officials act as parental surrogates and denied Fourth
Amendment immunity based on the doctrine of in loco parentis.
The Court stated that "in carrying out searches and other disciplinary functions pursuant to such policies, school officials act
as representatives of the State, not merely as surrogates for
the parents, and they cannot claim the parent's immunity from
the stricture of the Fourth Amendment. "40 Urinalysis testing
by public school officials is state action and is therefore a
Fourth Amendment search subject to scrutiny by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 41

36.
Id. at 337.
37.
Schaill I, 679 F. Supp. at 855; Schaill II, 864 F.2d at 1313·14.
38.
West Virginia State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
39.
469 u.s. 325 (1985).
40.
Id. at 336-37.
41.
See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25,
27-28 (1949). The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that "no State
shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1. See also Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30-31
(1963) (reaffirming that "the Fourth Amendment 'is enforceable against . . . [the
states] by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal Govern·
ment,' by the application of the same constitutional standard prohibiting 'unreason·
able searches and seizures.'") (quoting Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655).
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The appellate court also found urinalysis testing to be a
"search" under the Fourth Amendment. The U.S. Supreme
Court has held that a "search" occurs when an expectation of
privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed."42 Since Schaill I and Schaill II were decided in 1988,
the U.S. Supreme Court has specifically held that collecting
and testing urine intrudes upon reasonable expectations of
privacy and must be deemed a search under the Fourth
Amendment. 43

B. Urinalysis Testing of Student Athletes by TSC is a Reasonable Search Under The Fourth Amendment
In Schaill I, the district court acknowledged that students
do not "shed their constitutional rights ... at the schoolhouse
gates," but also recognized a narrowing of that concept in recent years. 44 Relying on the Supreme Court's ruling in T.L.O.,
both the district and appellate courts found urinalysis testing
of student athletes to be a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment without a demonstration of individualized suspicion.45

1.

Traditional reasonable suspicion requirements

Generally, federal courts have held that searches without a
warrant are "per se" unreasonable and therefore unlawful. 46
However, the Supreme Court has allowed "a few specifically
established and well delineated exceptions."47 In T.L.O., the
Court analogized searches in a school setting to those in both
administrative settings and those requiring "reasonable suspicion" concluding that:
[T]he accommodation of the privacy interests of schoolchildren
with the substantial need of teachers and administrators for
freedom to maintain order in the schools does not require
strict adherence to the requirement that searches be based on

42.
Schaill II, 864 F.2d at 1311-12 (quoting United States v. Jackson, 466 U.S.
109, 113 (1984).
43.
See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989);
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989).
44.
Schaill I, 679 F. Supp. at 851 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
Id. at 855-58; Schaill II, 864 F.2d at 1322.
45.
46.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
47.
Id.
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probable cause ....48
Applying this analysis, the T.L.O. Court upheld as "reasonable" the warrantless search of a school girl's purse based on a
reasonable suspicion that the student had been smoking on
school grounds in violation of school rules. 49 After noting that
the opening of the student's purse was "undoubtedly a severe
violation of subjective expectations of privacy,"50 the Court
canvassed the legitimate governmental interests which were
furthered by the search. The Court observed that "events calling for discipline are frequent occurrences and sometimes require immediate, effective action. "51 Further, the particular
demands of the school environment require teachers to use
"swift and informal disciplinary procedures. "52
In determining the level of suspicion required before a
search may be conducted, the appellate court in Schaill II
sought to "balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on
the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the
intrusion."53 The appellate court recognized that the U.S. Supreme Court, in T.L.O., had already struck the balance in the
context of school searches, and had determined that probable
cause and warrant requirements did not apply. 54 The test announced in T.L.O., which is specific to searches of students in
public schools by school authorities, states that "the legality of
a search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances of the search."55 The T.L.O.
Court emphasized that:

48.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341; See also id. at 340 {Powell, J. concurring) ("The
fundamental command of the Fourth Amendment is that searches and seizures be
reasonable, and although 'both the concept of probable cause and the requirement
of a warrant bear on the reasonableness of a search . . . in certain limited circumstances neither is required.") (quoting Almedia-Sanchez v. United States, 413
u.s. 266, 277 (1973)).
49.
Id. at 346.
50.
Schaill II, 864 F.2d at 1314 (quoting 469 U.S. at 338).
51.
Id. (quoting 469 U.S. at 339).
Id. (quoting 469 U.S. at 340).
52.
53.
Id. at 1313 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983); See
also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979) (In balancing the competing interests
under the Fourth Amendment, "[c]ourts must consider the scope of the particular
intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it,
and the place in which it is conducted.")
Schaill II, 864 F. 2d at 1314.
54.
55.
469 U.S. at 341.

106

BYU JOURNAL OF LAW AND EDUCATION

[1992

The determination of the standard of reasonableness governing any specific class of searches requires "balancing the need
to search against the invasion which the search entails." On
one side of the balance are arrayed the individual's legitimate
expectations of privacy and personal security; on the other,
the government's need for effective methods to deal with
breaches of public order. 56

The T.L.O. Court found that a public school's interests in
detecting drug use will outweigh intrusion upon the athlete's
privacy expectations if the school can establish that first, the
search was "justified at its inception" and second, the search
"was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first place. "57 The first prong
of the two-part test announced in T.L. 0. appears to imply that
reasonable individualized suspicion is required for a search to
be justified.
Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by a
teacher or other school official will be "justified at its inception" when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that
the search will tum up evidence that the student has violated
or is violating either the law or the rules of the school. Such a
search will be permissible in its scope when the measures
adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search
and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the
student and the nature of the infraction. 58

2.

Administrative search exception to individualized suspicion

Despite the language of the two-part test, "[t]he T.L.O.
Court expressly left open" the requirement of individualized
suspicion.59 The T.L.O. Court stated:
We do not decide whether individualized suspicion is an essential element of the reasonableness standard we adopt for
searches by school authorities. In other contexts, however, we
have held that although "some quantum of individualized
suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search

56.
ld. at 337 (citation omitted) (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523, 536-37 (1967)).
Id. at 341 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
57.
Id. at 341-42 (footnotes omitted).
58.
59.
Schaill I, 679 F. Supp. at 852.
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or seizure[,]" ... the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion. 60
The T.L. 0. Court continued:
Exceptions to the requirement of individualized suspicion are
generally appropriate only where the privacy interests implicated by a search are minimal and where "other safeguards"
are available "to assure that the individual's reasonable expectations of privacy is not 'subject to the discretion of the
official in the field.' 1161
The appellate court in Schaill II reported "several carefully defmed situations where the Court has recognized that searches
may be conducted in the absence of any grounds to believe that
the individual searched has violated the law. 1162 These situations include suspicionless searches of private dwellings, automobiles, airline passengers, travelers at borders and checkpoints and persons subject to searches in the administrative
context. 63
The most relevant of the exceptions reported is the administrative search exception. The appellate court's examination of
U.S. Supreme Court cases revealed that four important factors
are considered in "approving [warrantless, suspicionless]
searches in [the administrative search] context."64 First, an industry of pervasive regulation where search participants have
diminished expectations of privacy and have implicitly or explicitly consented to searches through voluntary decisions to
enter regulated industries. 65 Second, the regulatory scheme
which authorizes the search must further substantial governmental interests and the search must be necessary to further
the regulatory scheme. Generally, the imposition of a warrant
or reasonable suspicion standard must frustrate the purposes
of the regulatory scheme and an alternate, less intrusive means
of detection would not sufficiently serve the government's

60.
469 U.S. at 342 n.8 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543, 560-561 (1976)); See also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37
(1967).
Id. at 342 n.8 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 655 (1979) (cita61.
tion omitted)).
62.
Schaill II, 864 F.2d at 1315-16.
Id. at 1316-17 (footnotes and citations omitted).
63.
64.
Id.
65.
Id.
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inspections, including urinalysis testing, through their voluntary decision to participate. Mandatory physical examinations,
which include providing urine samples, are integral to almost
all athletic programs and have long been required by TSC's
program. 73 Moreover, the Indiana High School Athletic Association requirements included minimum grades, residency, eligibility and submission to training rules, including prohibitions
on smoking, drinking and drug use both on and off school premises. 74 Finally, the pervasiveness and visibility of drug testing of professional, collegiate and olympic athletes seriously
diminishes student athletes' expectations of privacy. The court
observed that "[t]he suspension and disqualification of prominent athletes on the basis of positive urinalysis results has
been the subject of intense publicity all over the world. "75

2. Urinalysis testing of student athletes is an appropriate
means to promote substantial interests
The appellate court in Schaill II affirmed the trial court's
fmding that TSC had made a reasonable decision in implementing its urinalysis program and held "that alternative
methods of investigation would not adequately serve the
school's interest in detection and deterrence of [illicit] drug
use." 76 TSC's urinalysis testing of student athletes is an appropriate means to combat illicit drug use among school-aged
children and student athletes. 77
In affirming the trial court's decision, the appellate court
agreed that TSC's student athlete urinalysis testing program
would: protect the health and safety of student athletes; preserve the integrity of interscholastic competition; promote student and community support for interscholastic athletics; and
promote "drug-free" interests among all school-aged children
throughout the public school system. 78

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1321.
Id.
Id.
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3. TSC's urinalysis testing program provides adequate safeguards against harassment and intimidation by limiting the
discretion of the inspecting school officials
As previously described, TSC's urinalysis testing program
is not subject to the discretion of school officials in the field. 79
Student athletes are on notice that they may be randomly
selected for testing through a procedure which prohibits discretion as to who will be chosen. Student athletes are also
aware of specific procedures governing the manner in which
the sample is obtained, handled, tested and how test results
may be challenged. These provisions of TSC's testing program
provide adequate safeguards against school officials using testing for the purpose of harassment or intimidation.

4. TSC's urinalysis testing is not intended to discover evidence
of criminal activity
After reviewing the basis for the Supreme Court's decisions
in T.L.O. and O'Connor v. Ortega, 80 the appellate court in
Schaill II concluded that searches conducted for civil or nonpunitive purposes may be valid in circumstances where searches conducted as part of a criminal investigation would not be
permissible. The court also stated that reasonable suspicion
requirements "traditionally (though not exclusively) applied to
law enforcement investigations, would unnecessarily intrude
upon the purposes of the classroom or workplace."81 The distinction between law enforcement investigations and the enforcement of school rules is "that a school official's primary
mission is not to ferret out crime, but is instead to teach students in a safe and secure learning environment. "82
TSC's urinalysis testing program was instituted to address
the negative consequences of illicit drug use and to enforce
school and interscholastic athletic rules. The program used
progressive sanctions that could be reduced through voluntary
participation in approved drug counseling. 83 The program is
"educational, diagnostic, and preventative, as opposed to puni-

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

See supra notes 21-33 and accompanying text.
480 u.s. 709 (1987).
Schaill II, 864 F.2d at 1314.
Id.
Id. at 1322.
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tive or disciplinary"84 and was not intended to discover evidence of unlawful activity for use in criminal prosecutions. 86
IV.

CONCLUSION

Illicit drug use is a major problem throughout all sectors of
American society, particularly among school-aged children and
interscholastic athletes. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit found that TSC's random drug testing program
did not violate privacy rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. Individual suspicion of drug use is not required in order
to test students in the public schools for drugs. Although the
U.S. Supreme Court has not yet specifically addressed random
drug testing in public schools, recent Court decisions upholding
random drug testing in the workplace support both Schaill
decisions. 86 Public school officials should be allowed and encouraged to adopt urinalysis testing programs similar to TSC's
Student Athlete Drug Education and Testing Program for the
purpose of detecting and deterring drug use among school-aged
children.

Paul K. Madsen

84.

85.

Schaill I, 679 F. Supp. at 836.
Schaill II, 864 F.2d at 1322.
In Skinner, the U.S. Supreme Court defined the standard of reasonableness

86.
stating:
[W]hen the balance of interests precludes insistent on a showing of probable cause, we have usually required 'some quantum of individualized
suspicion' before concluding that a search is reasonable. We made it clear,
however, that a showing of individualized suspicion is not a constitutional
floor, below which a search must be presumed unreasonable. In limited
circumstances, where the privacy interests are minimal, and where an
important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be
placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search
may be reasonably despite the absence of such suspicion.
489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989) (citations omitted).

